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Abstract— Biometric systems use personal biological or be-
havioural traits that can uniquely characterise an individual but
this uniqueness property also becomes its potential weakness
when the template characterising a biometric trait is stolen
or compromised. To this end, we consider two strategies to
improving biometric template protection and performance,
namely, (1) using multiple privacy schemes and (2) using
multiple matching algorithms. While multiple privacy schemes
can improve the security of a biometric system by protecting
its template; using multiple matching algorithms or similarly,
multiple biometric traits along with their respective matching
algorithms, can improve the system performance due to reduced
intra-class variability. The above two strategies lead to a novel,
ensemble system that is derived from multiple privacy schemes.
Our findings suggest that, under the worst-case scenario eval-
uation where the key or keys protecting the template are
stolen, multi-privacy protection scheme can outperform a single
protection scheme as well as the baseline biometric system
without template protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics is an enabling technology that uses personal
biological attributes such as face, fingerprint, iris, and signa-
ture, that can uniquely characterise an individual. However,
this uniqueness property also becomes its potential weakness
when the template of the system is stolen or compromised.
Even though a biometric template may contain only some
extracted features, for some biometric traits like fingerprint,
it is possible to approximately reconstruct a digital copy of
the biometric trait [1]. Therefore, biometric-based systems
need to consider its template security by providing methods
to revoke templates when they are compromised [2]. To this
end, we consider a number of strategies to improve biometric
template protection in this study, namely, (1) using multiple
privacy schemes and (2) using multiple matching algorithms.
While multiple privacy schemes can improve the security of
a biometric system by protecting its template, using multiple
matching algorithms or similarly, multiple biometric traits
along with their respective matching algorithms, can improve
the system performance due to reduced intra-class variabil-
ity [3]. The above two strategies lead to a novel, ensemble
system that is derived from multiple privacy schemes.
In a biometric system enhanced with a privacy scheme,
a stolen template cannot be introduced into another system
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or be directly associated with the user. Each biometric
template protected by a privacy scheme is unique only for
use by the intended biometric system. An important class
of privacy scheme deployed for biometric systems is known
as “cancellable biometrics” which transforms or intentionally
distorts the original biometric samples to protect the user’s
privacy. Therefore, the enhanced biometric system compares
two samples – the query sample that is collected live and
the template that has been collected during enrolment –
in the distorted feature space. Unfortunately, the use of
distorted biometric samples usually not only decreases the
system performance due to the introduced distortion function
or noise but also increases the computational complexity
in the matching process. Therefore, it is important for a
privacy protected biometric system to support a good trade-
off between discrimination capability as well as the degree
of non-invertibility of the distortion function in exchange for
a higher level of security.
Although a number of methods exist to combine infor-
mation sources, as described in [4], few studies system-
atically explore the effectiveness of multiple cancellable
functions or protection schemes in the context of information
fusion. The literature on information fusion considers the
following classes of systems: (i) multimodal system, which
combines multiple biometric traits collected by different
sensors; (ii) multi-algorithmic system, which uses different
features of the same biometric modality; (iii) multi-sample
system, which combines several samples or instances of the
same biometric modality; (iv) multi-sensor system, which
recognises a user based on one biometric modality through
the combination of different sensors (of the same modality).
A special case of multi-algorithmic biometric system is to
use several biometric feature representations, leading to a
multi-feature biometric system. Although recent progress
on biometric information fusion includes the combination
of auxiliary, non-discriminatory information such as user-
specific characteristics and biometric sample quality [5],
as well as combining multiple biometrics in the context
of template protection [6], the property of using multiple
protection schemes is not often not systematically evaluated,
at least not in the context of information fusion.
In addition, nearly all the studies on multibiometric tem-
plate protection focus on physiological biometrics such as
face, fingerprint, and iris, e.g., [cite works 40–44, 6 of
Rathgeb’s paper]. The level of protection for behavioural
biometrics, where the sample has much more variability, and
arguably less unique to an individual, and the possibility of
change in behaviour over time, merits an investgation on its
own right.
The closest work on multiple protection schemes applied
to the behaviour biometrics is [7], which suggests that an
ensemble system that is generated by one cancellable func-
tion has similar (Interpolation and Double Sum functions)
statistical performance compared with performance achieved
by the baseline ensemble system without any cancellable
functions. In addition, the authors showed that the use of
BioConvolving to the ensemble method can significantly
further improve the statistical performance of the ensemble
compared with the baseline system. We extend this work
to include BioHashing. Apart from adding more cancellable
functions, we also systematically evaluate the performance
of the ensemble using all possible combinations of the con-
stituent cancellable functions. Moreover, we compare each of
the possible combinations of ensemble with their respective
baseline systems (without the cancellable function) as well
as with a single privacy protection scheme.
Although the multi-privacy ensemble system improves the
recognition accuracy and the security of the overall system,
there are other issues not falling into the scope of the study.
We do not address the issue of increased computational
complexity as any improved security is expected to trade
off against the ease of use of the system. Another more
important issue is related to usability: how a biometric user
can use and properly manage the different keys needed by
the cancellable functions. This problem is not particularly
crucial for cancellable biometrics because even if an impostor
possesses the key used by a cancellable function, he/she
cannot recover the original biometric sample because the
cancellable functions are non-reversible. How to practically
help the user to manage or store the keys is a usability issue
that merits a proper study on usability as well as key design
and management.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are four-fold:
(1) proposal of a multi-privacy protection scheme applied
to biometrics; (2) performance evaluation of multi-biometric
system using sub-sets of protected biometric traits; (3) under-
standing the system performance in the context of decision
fusion, based on the ensemble method; and (4) applying the
system to behavioural biometrics.
This paper is divided into eight sections and it is organized
as follows. Section I showed the motivation and paper
contributions, Section II describes the subject background
of this paper, while the ensemble systems are described in
Section III. The cancellable transformations are described in
Section IV and the behavioural biometric dataset TouchAna-
lytics is discussed in Section V. The Experimental Methodol-
ogy is explained in Section VI, while the Section VII presents
and discusses the results obtained in the experiments. Finally,
Section VIII presents the final remarks of this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Related Work
Multi-biometric template protection systems offer signifi-
cant advantages, improving public confidence and acceptance
of biometrics because it can balance trade-off between accu-
racy and security. Thus, this subsection focuses four papers
closely related with our proposal.
The paper wrote by Rathgeb and Busch [6] presents a
discussion about issues and challenges of multi-biometric
template protection. The authors summarise and discuss
some characteristics of multi-biometric template protection
papers, which are: (1) fusion of biometric traits in feature
level, score level and decision level; (2) rearrangement of
biometric representation to provide a uniform distribution of
error probabilities; (3) combination of biometric modalities
increases security and accuracy; (4) use of different feature
extraction methods using one biometric modality; (5) use of
multi-biometric protection system using multiple protected
physical modalities. However, Rathgeb and Busch [6] do not
discuss the use of behavioural biometric in multi-biometric
protection systems. Therefore, this paper fills this gap investi-
gating the use of multi-biometric template protection systems
using behavioural modalities.
Canuto et al. [8] investigates the performance of system us-
ing multiple physical biometric samples. However, this paper
investigate the use of multiple behavioural biometric samples.
The use of behavioural biometrics is more challenging than
the use of physical because human behaviour is influenced
by different factors [9].
The empirical experiments performed in [9] show the
use of a single biometric samples multi-algorithm approach,
archiving interesting results in protected and unprotected
biometric samples. Unfortunately, the authors do not show
the advantageous of using multiple samples. This paper, con-
sequently, extends our previous work [7], adding a multiple
biometric samples approach in a multi-algorithm biometric
system.
Kelkboom et al. [10] discusses the application of template
protection in a multi-algorithm approach using a 3D-face
modality. The authors discuss the findings using different
fusion levels, feature-, score- and decision-level. Instead of
use of a majority voting (our proposal), the authors applied
the rules AND and OR to fusion the decision of biometric
system.
B. Cancellable Biometrics
Biometric sample is user-specific since the biometric
characteristics is unique and it is hard to be replaced in
case of being stolen or lost. One of the main problems
of security faced by biometric system is an unauthorized
copy of the stored biometric template [8]. Hence, biometric
templates must be stored in a protected way using a protec-
tion scheme that possesses the following four properties [2]:
(1) Diversity: the secure template must not allow cross-
matching across databases; (2) Revocability: it should be
easy to revoke a compromised template; (3) Security: it
must be computationally hard to obtain the original biometric
template from the secure template; and (4) Performance: the
biometric template protection scheme should not degrade the
recognition performance of a biometric system.
Unfortunately it is difficult to define a template protection
that can satisfy all these characteristics due to the trade-
off among them. In this way, several template protection
methods have been proposed in the literature [8]. In [2], these
methods were broadly divided in two approaches, which are:
(1) Biometric cryptosystem: Some public information about
the biometric template is stored and it is usually referred to
as helper data. From a cryptography system’s perspective,
biometric cryptosystems are also known as helper data-
based methods. (2) cancellable transformation: In this case,
a transformation function (f ) is applied to the biometric
template (T ) and only the transformed template (f(T )) is
stored in the database. The original template T is hard to be
obtained from f(T ).
Unfortunately, to compute f(T ) is required a key k. The
use of different keys generates inconvenience to users due to
necessity to present a key to each biometric sample used in a
biometric system. In our solution, each cancellable function
f(x) requires its own key k. Thus, a user will need to present
n different keys ki, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} to each cancellable
function. Our solution is not ideal, but we are working in a
new way to use cancellable template without any or several
keys.
III. ENSEMBLE SYSTEMS
Ensemble systems, also known as multi-classifier systems
or fusion of experts, exploit the idea that different classifiers
can offer complementary information about a sample that is
being classified; thereby improving the overall recognition
performance [11]. The improvement can be explained by
the diversity of the constituent classifiers in terms of per-
formance, as well as their underlying dependencies. Indeed,
it is possible to fully predict the fusion system given the
multidimensional class-conditional score distributions (for
the genuine and impostor classes) are known under a linear
fusion operator [3].
There are two main issues to consider in the design of
an ensemble: the ensemble components and the combination
method. In relation to the first issue, the ideal situation would
be to choose a set of base classifiers with uncorrelated errors,
which would be combined in such a way as to minimize the
effect of these failures. Depending on its particular structure,
an ensemble can be realised using two main approaches: het-
erogeneous, i.e, to combine different types of classification
algorithms; and homogeneous, i.e., to combine classification
algorithms of the same type.
The next step is to choose an effective way to combine the
components outputs, which is usually a typical decision-level
fusion method. If there are I component classifiers, there
will be I-choose-n possible ways of choosing the ensemble
decision. The combination of the classifiers outputs diverge
from the simplest approach using class labels or rank values
to the utilization of more elaborate information, such as
support degree D [11].
The use of different component classifiers in a ensem-
ble is a standard way to promote diversity. The common
combination ensemble methods such as bagging, boosting,
stacking, and voting [11] promote classifier diversity. This
paper uses the majority voting approach, which is based on
democracy voting system. The majority output class label of
the classifiers is the final output, i.e, each classifier presents
its class label output and the majority class label is the
winner. Voting (majority vote) decision fusion was selected
because it is a simple combination method which combines
homogeneous and heterogeneous components decision. Our
paper uses the voting in a user identity level, i.e, each
component votes in what type of user the claimed individual
is. The decision of ensemble is the majority voted user (client
or impostor).
Ensemble systems can use cancellable biometrics and
achieves very promising results [8, 12]. These papers show
the accuracy of biometric system using cancellable biometric
sample can be improved using an ensemble system. However,
the authors use only physical biometric modalities. Unlike
these studies, this paper applies a multi-privacy scheme
using ensemble systems using behavioural biometrics for
user verification task.
IV. CANCELLABLE FUNCTIONS
Cancellable transformation functions transform the bio-
metric samples in such a way that it is computationally hard
to get the original form [2]. Unfortunately, high variance
and noise are unintended consequence of transforming a
biometric sample using cancellable functions. Consequently,
user verification becomes more difficult. Thus, verification
and authentication systems which use cancellable biometric
samples must provide better performance than systems using
non-modified data.
The cancellable functions can be further classified as salt-
ing and non-invertible transformations. In the first case, the
transformation function f is invertible, while f , as implied, is
either non-invertible or hard to invert in the second case. The
use of a one-way function f , easy to compute (in polynomial
time) but hard to invert (given f(x), the probability of
finding x in polynomial time is small), is the main purpose
of using non-invertible transformations. Hereafter, the terms
transformation function or cancellable transformation will be
taken as referring to the non-invertible case.
The literature reports that ensemble systems offer better
performance than single classifiers [11] and performs well
in some cancellable biometric datasets [9]. Thus, we analyse
ensemble systems applied to behavioural biometric samples
using the following cancellable functions: Interpolation, Bio-
Hashing, BioConvolving and Double Sum. All the transfor-
mation functions are better described in [8].
A. Interpolation
This technique is based on polynomial interpolation. It
consists of generating a new biometric model by extracting
function points resulting from the attribute interpolation pro-
cess in such a way that the original attributes are preserved.
The attributes compose the original biometric model.
Although it is simple, this algorithm makes the inversion
of the transformed function difficult, thus generating a rea-
sonable level of security to the system. Therefore, it is very
efficient in satisfying two of the main requirements for trans-
formation techniques, which are simplicity and efficiency at
the same time.
B. BioHashing
BioHashing technique has originally used in other biomet-
ric modalities, such as fingerprint, palm and face [8]. Bio-
Hashing algorithm is characterized by transforming original
biometric into a non-invertible binary sequence. This invert-
ible binary sequence is based in a inner product between the
original biometric vector and each pseudo-random orthonor-
mal vector oi ∈ Rn | i = 1, ...,m. Each oi is obtained using
the Gram-Schmidt algorithm with original biometric data as
input.
BioHashing technique has originally used in other biomet-
ric modalities, such as fingerprint, palm and face [13]. In this
work we use the original BioHashing algorithm but in future
we will use the adaptation developed by our group, described
in [8].
C. BioConvolving
BioConvolving method was originally proposed for sig-
nature [8]. In this method, the transformed functions are
created through linear combinations of sub-parts of the
original biometric template Γ. Basically, this method divides
each original biometric sequences into W non-overlapping
segments, according to a randomly selected transformation
key d. Then, the transformed functions are obtained by per-
forming a linear convolution between the obtained segments.
According to [14], the BioConvolving security approach
is based on the fact that a blind deconvolution problem is
needed in order to retrieve the original template. Moreover,
in [14] it was also shown for signature that even if multiple
transformed templates are stolen, it is not possible to retrieve
the original template.
D. Double Sum
Double Sum cancellable transformation is a simple method
and it consists of summing the attributes of original biometric
model with two other attributes of the same sample. In
other words, each attribute of original biometric model is
transformed into the sum of three attributes randomly chosen.
In this case, even if an impostor has access to transformed
samples, it will not be possible to define original samples
from transformed one.
The double sum method can be considered as non-
invertible, since the number of possible combinations is very
high. For example, if a biometric model has n attributes,
there will be
Cs = n!
3 (1)
possibilities of generating the encrypted content. Therefore,
it is computationally infeasible to reverse the process in
a feasible time, especially for large n that is greater than
50; thus, justifying the non-invertibility and security of the
scheme.
The revocability of this method is guaranteed by the secu-
rity key. Indeed, the key is responsible for the reorganization
of the original biometric sample and for the choice of the
original attributes that will be summed. In case of being lost
or stolen, a new transformation model can be created using a
different security key k. In this paper, we are using the same
security key k and the dimension of the transformed model
is the same of the original dataset.
V. DATASET
The TouchAnalytics [15] dataset is a behavioural trait
collected through strokes in mobile touchscreen interaction.
TouchAnalytics is composed of 30 attributes derived from
observed strokes performed by 41 users. The number of
stroke attempts is different for each user. Thus, a stroke
is defined in [15] as a trajectory encoded as a sequence of
vectors with real numbers, sn = (xn, yn, tn, pn, An, ofn, o
ph
n )
where n ∈ 1, 2, ..., N enumerates the number of strokes
(and there are N strokes), with location xn, yn, time stamp
tn, pressure on screen pn, area An occluded by the finger,
finger orientation ofn, and phone orientation o
ph
n which can be
landscape or portrait. Therefore, it is possible to derive the
information about area covered, stroke pressure, direction,
velocity and acceleration from the above raw data.
TouchAnalytics is divided in horizontal and scrolling (ver-
tical) movements. Thus, it is possible to analyse the user’s
orientation patterns.
Frank et al. [15] presented some initial results using three
different scenarios, namely: (1) Inter Session: The goal is to
authenticate users across multiple sessions performed in the
same day; (2) Inter Week: The goal is to authenticate users
in two different sessions (the period of time between these
two sessions is one week); (3) Intra Session: All the user
data was used in the process, time independently.
In [15], the authors presented some results using k-NN
and SVM (Support Vector Machine) classifiers. In addition,
the authors use Equal Error Rate (EER) metric which reports
the performance of the system when the probabilities of false
acceptance and false rejection are equal.
According to Frank et al. [15], the median EER achieved
ranges from 0% to 4% across all sessions: Inter Session, Inter
Week and Intra Session. The median EER in Intra Session
are 0%. It seems that, within one session, most users do not
considerably change their touch behaviour. Inter Session EER
reaches from 2% to 3% and Inter Week EER reaches from
0% to 4%. These results indicate that behavioural biometrics
(touch data) have good perspectives in practical use.
VI. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the the proposed multi-privacy
protection scheme. In this scheme, each target user has
his/her own dedicated classifier. In order to train this user-
specific classifier, the construct a training data set consisting
of positive stroke samples, i.e., samples belonging to the
target user (or client/match samples) and negative stroke
samples, i.e., samples belonging to the remaining users (or
impostor/nonmatch samples). If there are J users, than, the
user-specific training set consists of one part of positive
training data and J − 1 parts of negative training data. In
order to adjust for the unbalanced user-specific training data
sets, we resample the negative stroke samples such that
every sample as a probability of NpNnc of being selected,
where Np is the number of positive samples and Nnc is the
number of negative samples. Therefore, by using the above
resampling method, each user-specific classifier is trained
with Np positive samples as well as Np negative samples,
thus creating a balanced training set.
Thus, our balanced user-specific dataset has Np positive
instances and Nnc × T negatives instances.
In the next step, we apply four cancellable transformation
functions to create four corresponding protected balanced
user-specific datasets. The Figure 1 illustrates these 2 steps:
(1) splitting and balancing the main dataset by user and
(2) applying the four cancellable functions. The next step
is to model the decision module after cancellable biometric
samples have been generated.
Fig. 1. Generation of cancellable biometric samples for each user
The system architecture is composed of three components:
(1) a pool of cancellable biometric schemes, (2) an ensemble
system, and (3) a decision fusion which is based on the
majority vote. If there are N cancellable schemes, then, there
are at most
∑
k C
N
k , for k ∈ {2, . . . , N} possible ways
of constructing the ensembles. For example, in our case,
there are 11 possible ensemble systems derived from four
cancellable schemes (N = 4), we will consider three sce-
narios, each with a different number of cancellable schemes,
namely: (1) the scenario with two cancellable schemes: C42 =
4×3/2 = 6 combinations; (2) three scheme scenario: C43 = 4
combinations; and finally (3) the scenario in which all the
four schemes are used: C44 = 1 combination. Figure 2 shows
the architecture of the system along with the decision module
which is based on the voting scheme.
Each of the 11 combinations is referred to by the conjunc-
tion of the first four letters of each constituent cancellable
scheme, namely, Inte for Interpolation, BioH for BioHashing,
BioC for BioConvolving, and Doub for DoubleSum. For
example, the scenario ‘InteDoub’ refers to the ensemble
consisting of the Interpolation and the Double Sum schemes.
Fig. 2. Flowchart represents the system architecture
In addition, for simplicity, we limit ourselves to using only
majority vote to combine the decision of k classifiers.
The ensemble system is composed of classifiers k-NN,
SVM, Naive Bayes and MultiLayer Perceptron. These clas-
sifiers were selected because they provide diverse learning
approaches and error bias. These characteristics increase
the ensemble diversity, which usually means leads to an
improvement in performance.
Our empirical study evaluates its performance using a
modified 10-fold cross-validation method. Our modified 10-
fold cross-validation ensures that the training set does not
have any biometric sample of subjects who are present in
the test set. Therefore, we test our system with biometric
samples that have not been processed in training phase. All
results presented in this paper refer to the mean over all
balanced user-specific datasets using 10-fold cross-validation
technique.
The classification algorithms of this investigation were
extracted from WEKA1 package. In addition, an exhaustive
investigation using a cross validation approach defined the
values of supervised learning algorithms parameters. Con-
sequently, the algorithms were executed with the following
parameters: k-NN with k = 5; SVM with polynomial kernel
(grid-search) , pruned decision tree, MLP (one hidden layer)
and Naive-Bayes with standard WEKA settings. The next
section will present and discuss the relative change of EER
values by combination experiment.
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents two different analysis: (1) compar-
ison of multi-privacy biometric scheme vs. single privacy
biometric scheme and (2) the relative change of EER(%)
in multi-privacy scenarios compared with baseline dataset
(Original dataset). Original dataset is a set of non-modified
biometric samples.
We use the Voting results available in [7] to compare the
results of multi-privacy against the single privacy biometric
scheme. The Table I presents the mean EER and standard
deviation of voting decision fusion using only one protected
biometric sample [7].
1http:www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/WEKA
TABLE I
VOTING - EER - PERCENTAGE. SOURCE: [7]
Horizontal Scrooling
scenario Median Standard Median Standard
Deviation Deviation
Original 9.7 5.8 8.9 6.4
Interpolation 13.7 5.8 10.9 6.7
BioHashing 33.5 9.7 32.6 12.6
BioConvolving 0.2 0.4 3.6 11
DoubleSum 11.9 6.9 11.4 7.5
Figures 3 and 4 exhibit the boxplots of EER by Scenario
achieved in this paper, using horizontal and scrolling strokes
respectively. The boxplots represent the EER median values
organized in an ascendind order, for better comparison and
readability
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Fig. 3. BoxPlot of horizontal scenarios
To analyse the multi-privacy scheme vs. single-privacy
we will check if multi-privacy can outperform the second
and third best median EER (Double Sum and Interpolation)
present in Table I. We don’t analyse the better case (BioCon-
volving) because its result in single protected scenario is very
good and hard to improve, 0.2% and 3.6% using horizontal
and scrolling strokes, respectively.
Using horizontal strokes, multi-privacy methods using
Interpolation and Double Sum samples increase the perfor-
mance of Interpolation, Double Sum single-privacy scenarios
in five out of seven cases (71.42%). Four cases are better
(57.14%) using scrolling strokes.
The performance of multi-privacy protection scheme using
BioHashing dataset together with at least one protected sam-
ple increases in 100% of cases, when compared with single
privacy scheme using BioHashing samples. See BioHashing
results presented in Table I and compare with BioHashing
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Fig. 4. BoxPlot of scrolling scenarios
boxplots present in Figures 3 and 4. This is an important find-
ing because the use of a cancellable biometric trait with poor
performance (BioHashing) can increase the performance of
a biometric system, when it is combined with a different
protected sample.
In both scenarios (horizontal and scrolling strokes), the
multi-privacy scenarios with BioConvolving achieve lower
median EER than median of single-privacy scenarios, i.e, the
use of BioConvolving samples increases the performance of
multi-privacy scheme compared with single-privacy schemes.
We can observe that all multi-privacy scenario boxplots
using BioConvolving have median values (Figures 3 and 4)
under all median values of single scenarios (Table I) (except
BioConvolving).
When comparing both directions, as in [9], the results
using horizontal strokes were better than scrolling ones. Us-
ing as metric the accumulated EER, we have a accumulated
EER of 90.9 and 140.6 for horizontal and scrolling datasets
respectively. We can observe a difference between horizontal
and scrolling accumulated EER of 49.7.
The EER of the scenarios using all protected biometric
samples is among TOP 5 results (Horizontal = 5th, Scrool-
ing=3rd), both lower than Original dataset. This result shows
that the use of all protected samples increase the performance
of the biometric system compared to its use with original
data, In addition, it minimizes all the disadvantages related
to use of a single non-protected scheme.
In our second phase of investigation, we will analyse
the different multi-privacy scenarios taking account the rel-
ative change of EER(%) using the multi-privacy scenarios
and Original samples (non-modified biometric sample). The
Figures 5 and 6 exhibit the boxplots ploted with relative
change of EER(%) using horizontal and scrolling strokes,
respectively. As Figures 3 and 4, the Figures 5 and 6 are
organized in a median ascending order.
The relative change of combination scenarios is obtained
by:
EERCombinedScenario − EEROriginal
EEROriginal
× 100%
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Fig. 6. BoxPlot of relative change of EER(%) using scrolling scenarios
The boxplots presented in Figure 5 show that 7 scenarios
(63.63%), out of 11, are better than Original dataset results.
In addition, the use of another privacy method together with
BioHashing decreases significantly the EER of BioHash-
ing samples, 28.6% in the best case (BioHashing EER −
BioCBioH EER).
The boxplot present in Figure 6 show that 6 scenarios
schemes, out of 11 (66%), are better than Original dataset
scenario. The same thing happened to BioHashing using
scrolling strokes. The EER decreased 24.9% in the best case
(InteBioCBioH) using BioHashing with another protected
sample.
These findings show that we can use multi-privacy protec-
tion scheme using voting decision function without deterio-
rating the performance of the biometric-based authentication
system, compared with the use of non-modified biometric
sample. As well, in most cases, using only one protected
biometric sample. The multi-privacy protected scenarios per-
forms better in at least 54,4% of cases, when compared with
Original sample use.
VIII. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a multi-privacy
biometric protection scheme using ensemble systems. The
multi-privacy scheme combines the use of multi-algorithm
and multiple protected biometric samples. Four cancellable
transformations (Interpolation, BioHashing, BioConvolving
and Double Sum) were used to protect a behavioral modality
(TouchAnalytics). The multi-privacy protection scheme was
applied to analyse the performance and security of a biomet-
ric system using ensemble systems and cancellable biometric
samples.
Multi-privacy protection scheme achieved better per-
formance compared with single protection scheme using
Original samples. Using horizontal strokes we obtained 7
(of 11 scenarios) better performance scenarios and 6 (of
11 scenarios) better scenarios using scrolling strokes, both
compared with the Original dataset scenarios.
Multi-privacy protection scheme has better perfor-
mance than single protection scheme, both using a
complex protected biometric sample. A combination of a
complex and a non-complex protected biometric sample in a
multi-privacy scheme increases the performance compared
with the single scheme using the same complex sample.
In our case, the use of another privacy method together
BioHashing decreases significantly the EER of Biohashing,
28.6% in the best case (BioCBioH). Using both stroke
directions, the performance (EER) of multi-privacy scheme
using BioHashing droped by 28.6% (BioCBioH - Horizontal)
and 24.9% (InteBioCBioH - Scrolling) in the best cases.
Multi- privacy protection scheme increase the per-
formance and security of biometric systems. Using the
relative change of EER (%) of multi-protection scheme,
the scenario using all the protected samples is in 5th and
6th place using horizontal and scrolling data, respectively.
This result shows that multi-protection scheme increases the
performance of a biometric system compared with its use
with the original biometric samples. Beyond this, the use of
multiple protected biometric samples provides more security
because the success rate of attacks such as shoulder surfing,
forgeries or brute force decreases.
Multi-privacy scheme improves the use of safe bio-
metric authentication systems. The use of diverse can-
cellable biometric samples requires different keys to code
the biometric sample. Thus, users can present only part
of encoding keys to the multi-privacy scheme because this
scheme can process a subset of protected representation.
From our results, we see that use of only two different
protected data presents low EER values for both stroke
directions.
Proposal Limitation Multi-Privacy Protection Scheme
(MPPS) increases user inconvenience because the individual
needs to present more than one key to encode his biometric
sample during user verification. In addition, the processing
time of multi-privacy scheme is higher than use of only non-
protected biometric sample but the increase of perfomance
and security can overcome this limitation. There is no
guarantee here that MPPS, which is a specialized ensemble
method, can be better than any protected biometric sample.
In our case, any multi-privacy scenarios were better than
BioConvolving (Table I), Figures 3 and 4).
Scenarios Limitation Our scenarios just model the solu-
tion based on protected biometric representation. Hence, we
need to taking into account user-specific samples because
user samples influences the biometric system performance.
Another limitation is the use of only voting decision fusion,
we plan to use other ensemble architectures, such as boosting
and bagging. In addition, we will analyse the performance
of multi-privacy protection scheme using score-fusion, taking
into account protected user-specific scenarios.
As a future work we will focus in solving the proposal
and scenario limitations, as well as, try to understand why
scrolling scenarios shows worst results compared to horizon-
tal strokes, to understand why BioConvolving has low EER
values and to propose a new biometric protection method.
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